At first glance, it sounds like an overly complex maneuver: Ukrainian drones hit Russian oil infrastructure, Russia halts or redirects Kazakh oil, the refinery in Schwedt, Germany, loses part of its feedstock, Berlin and Brandenburg grow anxious, and pro-Russian forces in the FRG gain a new argument against sanctions and support for Ukraine. Yet, this is exactly what the new dimension of the energy war looks like today.
It’s not just about oil. It is about the Kremlin's attempt to turn its own vulnerability—strikes on Ust-Luga, Novorossiysk, Druzhba, and other infrastructure—into political leverage against Ukraine.
The Key Node: PCK Schwedt Refinery
The central hub of this story is the PCK Schwedt refinery in Brandenburg, located about 100 km northeast of Berlin. It is one of Germany’s most vital refineries, with a capacity of approximately 11.5–12 million tons of oil per year. It supplies the vast majority of fuel for Berlin, Brandenburg, and parts of eastern Germany. Estimates often indicate that up to 90% of the fuel for Berlin and Brandenburg is linked specifically to Schwedt.
Before the full-scale war, the plant was historically configured for Russian oil delivered via the Druzhba pipeline. After 2022, Berlin formally renounced Russian oil, but part of the new scheme remained tied to Russian infrastructure: Kazakh oil began arriving at Schwedt through the same Druzhba line via Russian territory. On paper, it is no longer Russian crude, but physically, the route still passes through Russia.
Russian Pressure on a Pain Point
This is exactly where the Kremlin applied pressure. As of May 1, 2026, Russia announced the suspension of Kazakh oil transit to Germany via Druzhba. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak cited a vague formula regarding "technical capabilities."
However, the figures explain why this matters: in 2025, Kazakhstan supplied 2.146 million tons of oil to Germany via Druzhba (approx. 43,000 barrels per day). In the first quarter of 2026, it supplied another 730,000 tons. For Schwedt, this represents about 17% of its annual feedstock base.
Formally, this isn't a total collapse. But for a plant already operating below full capacity, it is a serious blow. In May, Brandenburg authorities stated that supplies for PCK were secured at about 80% capacity, down from earlier estimates of 85%. While Schwedt isn't stopping, its margin of safety is shrinking.
Brandenburg Premier Dietmar Woidke is working to prevent panic. His line is to stabilize the plant, save jobs, and prevent the issue from sparking social unrest in eastern Germany. Following a crisis group meeting, he stated that PCK’s load remains stable, May supplies are secured at 80%, and jobs are protected. This is crucial not only economically but politically: PCK employs over 1,000 workers and anchors an entire local industrial cluster. Consequently, the federal government extended employment guarantees for PCK workers until the end of 2026.
Berlin’s Plan: Gdańsk, Rostock, and Rosneft
The official plan of Berlin and Brandenburg consists of three parts: Gdańsk, Rostock, and legal decoupling from Rosneft.
-
Gdańsk, Poland: The idea is simple—tankers bring oil by sea to Poland, which then moves through the pipeline system to Germany. The Polish operator PERN confirmed the technical capability to help, but Warsaw offers no unconditional guarantees. Additional volumes depend on operational and market factors.
-
Rostock–Schwedt: This is a German Baltic route. Tankers enter the port of Rostock, and the crude is piped to Schwedt. The problem is that this pipeline was not historically designed to fully replace Druzhba. PCK has requested approximately €400 million in state support to modernize the Rostock–Schwedt pipeline to increase capacity, but this is not a quick fix.
-
Rosneft: This is the most painful point. The Russian company still legally owns 54.17% of PCK Schwedt, though the plant has been under German state "trusteeship" since 2022. Rosneft continues to litigate against the FRG government, filing a new lawsuit in March 2026. This creates a state of legal limbo, blocking investment and complicating the sale of shares held by other stakeholders, such as Shell.
The Kremlin's Calculation and FRG Domestic Politics
The situation is dangerous because while alternatives exist, they are more expensive and politically vulnerable. A pipeline provides a stable flow; maritime logistics via Gdańsk or Rostock involve freight, insurance, port handling, and the need to adapt the refinery to different oil grades.
The chain of events is as follows: Ukraine strikes Russian oil infrastructure — Russia claims "technical problems" with transit — Schwedt loses feedstock — Berlin grows nervous over fuel and jobs — AfD and BSW enter the fray — the federal government faces internal pressure — Moscow expects Germany to informally ask Ukraine to be "more careful."
While the official German government isn't doing this directly, internal political opponents are already amplifying Russian narratives. The AfD argues that sanctions hurt Germany more than Russia, using Schwedt as a case study for manipulating fear over fuel prices. Sahra Wagenknecht's BSW demands "pragmatism" and cheap energy.
Kazakhstan as a Hostage
In this scheme, Kazakhstan becomes a third hostage. While Astana wants to sell its oil to the EU, its primary export routes (Druzhba, CPC, Novorossiysk) still pass through Russian territory. Moscow uses Kazakh oil as a "blameless" tool for pressure.
Will the Trap Work?
Can the Kremlin actually force Ukraine to stop strikes on Ust-Luga? Directly—almost certainly not. Ukraine strikes Russian infrastructure because oil finances the war. Ust-Luga and Novorossiysk are components of the energy machine of aggression.
However, the Kremlin is trying to raise the diplomatic cost of such strikes by creating political noise in Europe. If Schwedt holds at 80% and Gdańsk/Rostock close the deficit, the Russian gambit fails. It would only prove that Germany must build post-Russian infrastructure faster.
The Kremlin is unlikely to stop Ukraine, but it is doing everything to make these strikes a problem for Berlin as well. The key question now for Germany: why, four years into the full-scale war, does the Russian Federation still have leverage over the energy security of its capital?
If Germany responds with pressure on Ukraine, the Kremlin wins. If the response is the final ousting of Rosneft and the modernization of logistics, the Russian trap will snap shut empty—marking a strategic victory for all of Europe.
